Abstract
Such suggestions, though, associate a peremptory norm with a quest for the institu tional sources of general international law, the source thesis being traced to Roman law, as Sabine Grebe argued. 17 The crucial question is this: 'Why is such a norm or, indeed, its institutional source, binding upon nonstate as well as state actors?' What is it about the international community which explains why peremptory norms are binding upon states and nonstates, individuals and groups?
This article responds to the question 'Why is a peremptory norm binding upon state and nonstate actors?' My argument is as follows. First, I attend to the tradi tional response to the effect that a peremptory norm exists in terms of the traditional sources of general international law. I take one such aspect of general international law -namely, a customary legal norm -in order to highlight problems with the sources thesis. I then turn to the sources thesis, best associated with Article 53 of the Statute of the International Court. Each generally accepted source of general international law constructs a circuitous and tautological response to the issue 'Why is a peremptory norm binding upon state and nonstate actors?'. With this in mind, I suggest in section 2 that a peremptory norm somehow relates to the international community as a whole. Here I offer three senses of an international 9 840 EJIL 23 (2012), community: an aggregate of the wills of selfwilling states; a rationally constructed community where each state possesses an 'associative' relationship with the com munity; and an international community nested in the social ethos. I draw here from Hegel's theory of international law, as hinted elsewhere. 18 My claim is that a peremptory norm protects such an ethos and, in particular, the legal order of such an ethos. If the peremptory norm is violated, so too the very existence of the legal order is undermined. To take one example and only as one example, if many states could torture inhabitants, nonnationals, or stateless persons, and if such states could do so under the colour of international (or domestic) legal standards, would the standards, although identifiable in the sources of law, be binding? Would there be an international legal order?
The Sources Thesis
International adjudication and jurists' opinions not infrequently begin with the recognition of peremptory norms in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 53 of the Convention provides that a peremptory norm is 'accepted and re cognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted' and, secondly, that the norm may be 'modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character'. Let us address the latter requisite. A general international legal norm, however, offers little guidance to the jurist, not least because there is so little consensus as to what is general international law. General international law, in turn, has been considered 'moral commandments … considered by the conscience of mankind to be indispens able for the coexistence of man in organized society', the shared principles of domes tic legal orders, international legal standards, and general principles generated from treat ies, customs, and opinio juris. 19 More often than not, jurists are satisfied with a list of norms which are continually repeated as peremptory in international law rhetoric: the right to state selfdetermination and the prohibitions against the use of force, torture, enslavement, mass internal displacement, and mass disappearances. 20 The list is often supplemented by an appeal to a Latin phrase, jus cogens ('compelling law') without more, as if the Latin reference can legitimize the label of peremptory.
The consequence is that instead of clarifying the identity of a peremptory norm, the diverse sources open the door for the expert knowers of legal rhetoric to conclude, without more, which norms are peremptory.
What is crucial to appreciate in all this is the objective of the jurist's legal inquiry. The quest for the identity of a peremptory norm in institutional sources leaves the allimportant question, 'why is the norm compelling?', to the side. Various concerns have been expressed about this endeavour. 21 The concerns have focused upon how peremptory norms can be identified in customary norms. Once we contextualize a peremptory norm in terms of its identity as a selfstanding rule, though, more issues are left unsettled than jurists have taken for granted.
A The Peremptory Norm as a Customary Norm
Let us turn to the nature of a customary norm as one possible source of a peremp tory norm. The circuitous character of such an inquiry is apparent. 22 In order for there to be a sense of obligation towards a peremptory norm, the peremptory norm must already exist as a discrete and selfstanding rule. How does it exist without there being a sense of obligation? Similarly, before the peremptory norm exists as a custom ary norm, consistent state practices must manifest a sense of obligation. Further, if a peremptory norm is grounded in the sources thesis, the two requisites of such a norm -a sense of obligation by state officials and state practices -may change through time and thereby render the peremptoriness of a norm suspect. 23 Although an individual right may initially exist outside the structure of peremptory norms, such a right may also emerge as a peremptory norm. 24 A violation of an existing customary rule disconfirms the rule so that it becomes less weighty as a rule on the next occasion when a rule is disobeyed. 25 Since the weight of time seems to be a rel evant factor, how many years or months must transpire before a sense of obligation and state behaviour manifest a peremptory norm? If a peremptory norm may lose its weightiness through calendar time, why is it described as peremptory 
B The Logic of a Right
One explanation has been said to rest in the logic of a right. The problem here, once again, is that the inquiry into a discrete and selfstanding right misses the possibility that a peremptory right represents some ultimate form independent of the identity of the right. Such a misdirected inquiry concerns the legal duty reciprocally associated with an individual right. A state is said to possess duties to protect its inhabitant, one might say, because the inhabitant has human rights. Without such rights there can not be duties, and vice versa. 26 The Furundzija judgment follows this line of thought when it holds that a duty towards the 'international community' inevitably infers a 'correlative right' by each member to enforce the duty.
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The International Law Commission has rejected such a dyadic analysis of peremp tory norms, however. 28 An individual or group possesses peremptory rights even though the state does not acknowledge its duties to protect the individual rights. If the state or states do not recognize such duties, how can one identify a peremptory right? And what institution or official resolves the issue of 'which rights are peremptory'? And why is this right peremptory and that one is not? Is the duty owed to some entity other than a state or its officials or inhabitants? To the international community, for example? Something more needs to be addressed aside from the identity of a discrete right or duty.
International adjudication leaves this prior 'something more' to the side. The Namibia Advisory Opinion in 1971, for example, did recognize that states owed peremptory duties but the International Court offers little explanation as to why. 29 The Court has continued to accept the existence of peremptory norms in the East Timor, Nuclear Weapons, and Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina) cases. And yet, the Court has 26 Hohfeld, supra note 16. 27 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (CA), supra note 16, at para. 151. 28 Crawford, 'Introduction', supra note 9, at 7. 29 31 Even the ILC's study of state responsibility accepts the existence of peremptory norms without pressing further as to why this or that norm is so peremptory.
32 Once a peremptory norm is said to be identified as a right traceable to one of the sources accepted in Article 18 of the Statute of the International Court, our role, as lawyers, seems complete. Or so we assume. If enough jurists just accept this or that proscrip tion as peremptory, we need only label the proscription as jus cogens and proceed to the identity of the next possible peremptory norm on the list as if intellectual inquiry is closed. The peremptory norm is left in the air. This very association of a peremp tory norm with an institutional source as if the norm were discrete and selfstanding constitutes a blind spot of contemporary international legal analysis. The blind spot takes for granted that a peremptory norm can be found, as Judge Weeramantry of the International Court once stated, in 'a series of separate rights erga singulum'. 33 A deeper issue than the identity of the discrete norm is forgotten despite its presence in Western legal thought, namely: why is an international legal norm binding?
C The Wrong Question
The wrong question is being asked when jurists examine the sources of international law in order to understand whether a particular norm is peremptory. How does a peremptory norm differ from an ordinary customary norm except by the number of times legal rhetoric cites the norm? The identity of a peremptory norm is all the more problematic when one appreciates the ironic twist that it is a treaty, the VCLT, which is invariably offered as the authority for the existence and the identity of peremptory norms. What confers the authority of the Vienna Convention to privilege the identity of a peremptory norm in general international law? The missing referent in the analyses of peremptory norms returns us to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention. I noted above that Article 53 raised two factors in the elucida tion of a peremptory norm. The one which I addressed above concerns the locus of a peremptory norm in general international law. The other requires that the norm be 'accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole from which no derogation is permitted'. This condition precedent for a peremptory norm addresses a very different issue from the sources thesis. Rather than searching for the source that will identify a legal norm, the condition precedent asks the question 'Why is an identifiable legal norm binding?'. In order to be binding, the peremptory norm, once identified, refers to some international community which, despite its interde pendence, is objective vis-à-vis the ordinary norms of an international (or domestic) legal order.
The dependence of a peremptory norm upon the international community has been taken for granted in both treaties and international adjudications. The pre amble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, for example, asserts that freedom, justice, and peace are founded in the rights 'of all members of the human family'. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 situates 'the general principles of law' in a 'community of nations'. Other multilateral and regional treaties continue the presupposed relationship. 34 Perhaps the most often quoted dictum to this effect is the ICJ's Barcelona Traction, to the effect that an obligation to the international community differs from an obligation to a particular state. 35 State officials are not immune from prosecution for violating peremptory norms against the international community according to the House of Lords in Pinochet. 36 The European Court of Human Rights has extended this principle to civil proceedings. 37 are increasingly accepting the dependence of peremptory norms upon the inter national community. 38 And the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility have consistently appealed to the 'international community as a whole' as the basis of peremptory norms. 39 The problem is that the quest for the identity of a discrete and selfstanding rule or right does not explain why the rule or right binds state members and nonstate members. The latter requires a study of the relation of the content of the rule or right to the international community as a whole. How are peremptory norms justified in terms of the international community if the members of the norms are identifiable in terms of state behaviour? Put differently, what is it that renders the international community a community? When does a member owe a duty to the international com munity as opposed to a national of another state? Why? And are all inhabitants of the globe protected by peremptory norms? Even the Barcelona judgment excluded inhabit ants from the protection of peremptory norms if lacking a stateconferred nationality: '[h]owever, on the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality'.
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There must be something about the international community which generates the binding character of a law. States, though unharmed individually, may generally lay a claim of harm to the international community as a whole. The international commu nity is especially harmed when peremptory norms are harmed. What is this interna tional community in whose name states and nonstates owe obligations and in whose name individuals and groups are conferred rights?
One approach has characterized the international community as 'the civilized world'. Although the association continues to the present day, 41 century court decisions and treatises. 42 In an earlier day, civilization was associ ated with being Christian. 43 Recognition of membership as civilized was, as James Crawford has put it, 'a sort of juristic baptism, entailing the rights and duties of international law'. 44 Why is one society considered 'civilized' and another not so? And why do we describe a community as international if uncivilized nations are excluded?
The international community has also been said to be recognizable, secondly, when states contravene 'the conscience of mankind'. 45 The Israeli District and Appeal Courts offered this as one of the two bases for the charge against Eichmann: his crimes 'offended the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations'. 46 How can a state member have the intentionality of a conscience? Given the contem porary daytoday reports of torture by most states, what is the source of the con science of these same states? A third approach, recognized in the drafting process leading to Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT, identifies the international community with the 'criteria of morality and 'public policy'. 47 Needless to say, the senses of morality radically differ from each other in international law commentaries, and the dominant Kantian view may well support one sense of the international community to the exclusion of a more important one in the context of peremptory rights. 48 And 'public policy' may well circuitously take one back to the justificatory objective of the peremptory norm. Once again, we are left with an empty concept: which public (the state or the international community) of the policy, and what policy, one might ask?
More likely, what we signify by 'public policy' will remain empty of the objective of the peremptory norm; that is, it may constitute a 'mere puff ', to quote Lord Lindley in Carbolic Smoke Ball. 49 42 The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677 (1900). 43 Crawford, 'Introduction', in Crawford, supra note 9, at 14-16. However, one can still find the criterion of 'civilized nation' in relatively recent cases: see, e.g. To make a further effort to understand a peremptory norm in terms of its source, the international community has been said to exist by virtue of 'basic human values'. 50 But why the values are 'basic', we have just found, depends upon the character of the inter national community. Why turn back to the identity of a basic norm? In any case, which values? And who is the 'we'? Why our values rather than yours? Does this, in turn, depend upon which of us is physically the stronger or which of us controls the interna tional rhetoric? It has not helped to say, as does the ILC, that the international commu nity is 'more inclusive'. 51 The international community has been said to include, to take Malanczuk's suggestion, 'all organized entities endowed with the capacity to take part in international legal relations', including stateless individuals and groups, insurgents, transnational corporations, NGOs, insurgents, minorities, 'peoples', and nationals who lack a minimal legal or economic security of protection.
52 If the international commu nity includes all of the above, why? May we just posit such without explanation or guid ance? The ILC and the Committee of the ICCPR have asserted that peremptory norms are owed to individual human beings. 53 Why individual beings and not groups and other entities, as suggested by Malanczuk? Patrick Kelly has described the international community as a mere metaphor. 54 A metaphor associated with what? 55 Can we be sat isfied with conclusory assertions as advocates of law or as members of the academy?
The issue may be put this way. If consent (as manifested in treaties and custom ary norms) generates and legitimizes peremptory norms, then such norms depend upon and reinforce the arbitrary wills of the aggregate of states. Universality exists, but only within each state's territorial borders. When a state contravenes the peremp tory norm, the legitimacy/authority of the international community in which the peremptory norm is nested is annulled. What is it about a community which renders a peremptory norm binding independently of domestic laws? We are faced with the issue addressed by Socrates' 'Speech of the Laws' in the Crito (50b) and by Plato in the Gorgias (471e-d, 484c, 486c, 493c) as well as by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right and in his lectures on the legitimacy of law, namely: why is the selfconscious subject bound to a law independent of the subject?
Three Senses of an International Community
Unless we can gain a sense of the relation of a peremptory norm with the interna tional community, we will be left with conclusory assertions about the existence of a 50 Dubois, supra note 45, at 161-166. 51 See, e.g., Crawford, 'Introduction', supra note 9, at 40; Art. 48 and Comm., at 40, at para. 10, at 278.
However peremptory norm. Such a conclusory assertion is exemplified when Malanczuk pos its that the existence of the international community is 'too logical and reasonable to be challenged', 56 and when Hugh Thirlway asserts that the international com munity exists as 'a matter of faith'. 57 In a similarly posited manner, Eric Wyler and Alain Papaux suggest that the less said the better. 58 Chusei Yamada has expressed frustration in the endeavour to justify peremptory norms in terms of the ultimate referent of the international community. 59 After a deep analysis on the nature of international law, Peter Fitzpatrick offers that the international community is a mere empty form. 60 Jurists are increasingly asserting that there is such a thing as 'the international community as a whole', and yet little content is attributed to the relation of peremptory norms to such a community. 61 Let us turn to three senses of an international community in an effort to ascertain whether such a community is a mere empty form.
A The Community as an Aggregate of the Particular Wills of States
With the mystery of peremptory norms in mind, one sense of the international community suggests that it is the totality of an aggregate of the particular wills of state members. A distinction is needed here. A hard sense of a state's will takes for granted that the state is selfreliant. It needs no other state for its existence. Too many examples of such a view of a state manifest the state conflict today. A soft sense of a state's will suggests that a state exists only by virtue of its dependence upon other states. A bilateral treaty, much like a contract, exemplifies such a dependent rela tionship. This interdependency has especially characterized the UN Charter as well as human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Geneva Conventions I-III, the Refugee Convention, and the Statelessness treaties. The international community is possible with the soft sense of a state. However, the community is constituted from the aggregate of the wills of territorially bounded states.
Three problems envelop this first sense of the relation of peremptory norms and the international community. First, is an international legal order of such a community possible if its norms are the totality of the wills of states members of the community? Such members possess the legal authority to decide who are their nationals or mem bers. Does an international community which defers to such a freedom of its members necessitate the exclusion of individuals or groups or societies from the community? Is a person 'lawfully in the territory of a state Party' to the ICCPR, for example, if s/he lacks legal recognition by any state member of the aggregated international com munity? Is a duty owed to a person if state officials consider the individual an insur gent, an illegal combatant, or a terrorist? Do peremptory norms leave some persons unprotected?
Contemporary analytical jurisprudence offers great weight to this first sense of an international community. 62 What renders this community legitimate, we are advised, is the express (in the case of treaties) and implied (in the case of customary norms) consent of a state. A great tradition, which grounds the international community in terms of consent, has emerged with Thomas Hobbes and continues to the present day. The kernel to this theory rests on the presupposition that a state is an author, 63 the author is selfgenerating, 64 and a law is binding if it has been authored in the proper manner and form. The consent theory of an international community presupposes that an author creates or determines norms which are located in a legal objectivity. Such an author cannot countenance a competing source of binding laws within its territorial control.
Because the peremptory norms of such an international community take the authorial basis of law for granted, the peremptory norms can hardly stand out from the aggregate of separate but equal authors, each with a will of its own. The inter national community preserves a domaine réservée for each state author to express its own will. Like the League's Covenant, the UN Charter takes this will for granted: '[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter' (Article 2(7), emphasis added). The will of each state is considered equal (Article 2(1) UN Charter). The protected space of the state author is 'inherent', 'inviolable', and 'fundamental', to use the terms of the UN Charter. No institution external to the state may interfere with the stateauthor's freedom to express itself within its territorial 850 EJIL 23 (2012), control, at least in this sense of an international community. 65 That the legality of such an intervention by an international organization is authorized only if the state itself has expressly or impliedly consented to the intervention is a principle of general international law.
This takes us to a second problem. The presupposed requisite of state consent to peremptory norms incorporates a crucial bounded character into the international community. A state exists by virtue of its claim of title over a territory. But just that claim takes for granted a territorial boundary. Such a bounded space includes some and excludes others by virtue of the territorial boundary. Much as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill extend the inner freedom of the individual to states, outsiders to the bounding of the state's space may trespass a state's territorial boundary only upon the consent of the state's officials. 66 A state is free to fail to recognize another state as a member of the international community. 67 More importantly, by virtue of its freedom, a state is free to decide who may inhabit its territory and who may not.
The exclusion of outsiders to the state's territorial boundary extends to the inter national community as a whole. The bounded space of a state and the consequential incorporation of such territorial boundaries into the international community raise the prospect that some inhabitants of the globe may remain without protection by norms considered peremptory. Nomadic groups, traditional societies, undocumented migrants, travellers, and unregistered people of the street may indirectly remain unrecognized members of the international community. If states or social groups are left outside the territorial boundary of a state member, how can one say that there are peremptory norms? How can an interdependent interest exist without being the product of the particular interests of individual states? Why does the 'common bene fit' of different states constitute a community rather than the interests of a temporary amalgam of territorial entities?
The third problem rests in the reification of the express and implied consent vis-à-vis the social ethoi of the aggregate of state wills. This reification arises because of two phenomena. First, the customary practices are lifted by an act of intellectualization into an intellectual abstraction. It is not just one experienced event but a regularity of such events which constitute the regularity. The regularity is thereby transformed from an experienced event or idiosyncratic practice into an intellectual act about the event in relation to other events. The second phenomenon recognizes such a regular ity as a rule. The rule is a concept in a still higher metaphysical level. Here, a con cept recognizes the 'observed' regularity of experienced events as a sign. The signified regularity as a rule is an intellectualization about the regularity of events/practices as if such a rule is synonymous with the regularity, let alone with the generating experienced event.
The international community, as constituted from the express and implied consent of states, is the product of such twofold acts of intellectualization. These acts of intel lectualization risk reifying the community vis-à-vis the socialcultural ethoi of soci eties, individuals, groups, and organizations. The international community thereby becomes autonomous of experienced events as well as autonomous of discrete rules and doctrines about the experiences, let alone about their event.
All this reification transpires as if the peremptory norms of the international com munity are binding by virtue of the consent of states. The concepts become increas ingly reified as jurists forget the iterative social experiences which generated the state practices. 68 Each act of intellectualization validates the next in the name of consent as manifested in state practices. The concepts become dependent upon each other just as state members become dependent upon each other. At some point, the structure of rules is justified in terms of the weightiness of a rule vis-à-vis other rules, not in terms of the iterative experienced events. The aggregate of the wills of states gains a struc ture of concepts, but the structure risks becoming exterior to the generative iterative social experiences which are said to generate the wills of the states. Interestingly, even the appeal to customary norms dissolves into an intellectual abstraction about empiri cally observable regularities of social behaviour. As H.L.A. Hart himself acknowledges with respect to the domestic legal structure of the state member:
[w]e only need the word 'validity', and commonly only use it, to answer questions which arise within a system of rules where the status of a rule as a member of the system depends upon its satisfying certain criteria provided by the rule if recognition. No such question can arise as to the validity of the very rule of recognition which provides the criteria; it can neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way. 69 The concepts (sc. rules and principles), not the preconceptual iterative social expe riences, guide the state's officials.
And so, what began as everyday practices by states and nonstates is intellectualized into an abstraction about an abstraction in the name of iterative social experiences. This is so despite the claim that both requisites of the implied consent theory, the sense of obligation and state practices, are generated from social behaviour. The transforma tion of social behaviour into a reified structure of concepts also transpires despite the contemporary acceptance of the transformation as 'democratic'. 70 The reification is even more apparent if all one does is to aggregate utterances, as documented by state and international officials, rather than to inquire into the actual contextspecific prac tices by state officials.
EJIL 23 (2012), One would certainly be hard pressed to describe the consent approach as 'sociologi cal' or empirical. The content of the rule on regularities about iterative social experi ences is immaterial. As Gerald Postema posits, 'it is tempting to say that, at least for jurisprudential purposes, it does not matter what the reasons for acceptance are, what matters only is that it [the custom] is accepted'. 71 The rule about the regularities of social practice is independent of the content of the practices. The actual events of social behaviour of state actors (and of inhabitants inside a state's territorial control) are forgotten. And what we call a peremptory norm also risks being reified from the ethoi of the international community. The community does not exist for its members. Peremptory norms thereby become products of acts of intellectualization about other concepts reified from the ethoi of an international community.
B The Rational International Community
Let us turn to a second sense of the international community and the relation of peremptory norms thereto. Here, the international community is a rational con struct of arguments and the principles derived from the arguments. What generate the identity of the international community's concepts (sc. rules and principles) are the justifications of the concepts. Such justifications appeal to unwritten background or consciously recognized higherordered concepts. The legal structure of concepts, albeit forever incomplete, is the consequence. Thomas Franck elaborates this sense of a rational international community. 72 Arguments and concepts, in Franck's view, produce a 'rules community' or 'community of principle'. 73 Peremptory norms pre sumably lie at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of norms. Rights and duties, as discrete units of the structure of concepts, are linked to the whole. 74 In this regard, norms are interdependent. 75 The rational community is 'open to change from arguments', as Dworkin puts it. 76 The whole, though, is a metaphysical whole. More about this in a moment.
The international community, however, is not entirely the product of the justifica tions of concepts. The expert knowers of the concepts must believe that rational jus tifications will constitute a legal order. Jurists just cannot climb outside this rational community in order to observe whether the rules and principles are practised in the social ethos of the international community. 77 Each partner in the community must act from a desire or belief rationally to justify conceptions, not from a desire to observe and recognize whether unwritten customs have crystallized into guiding rules. 78 Inner beliefs do generate why a jurist will justify this over that concept. Indeed, the very pursuit itself is based upon a belief: 'objectivity and truth', Dworkin once wrote, 'you'd better believe it'. 79 And as Dworkin ends his Law's Empire, we have to hope that there will be a consensus based upon arguments about the conceptions that justify our beliefs. 80 The selfwilled author here is not the state but a cadre of interpreters. Their rationally cohesive narrative structure constrains the actions of the state. A selfgenerating author is constructed as impliedly consenting to the narrative. Without authorinterpreters will ing and capable of arguing about concepts there would be no international community, according to this theory. Opinio juris will especially play an important role in the iden tity and construction of the international community. The international community is located in an objectivity intellectually constructed by opinio juris. And the author is the interpreter of such an objectivity. When Franck focuses upon 'who are the community's members?' he admits that the members are states. 81 Dworkin also takes this for granted. Now, what is the endpoint of the objectivity of the international community, generated as it is from a human subject's belief in such an objectivity? What we call the 'international community as a whole' becomes an ultimate empty or indetermi nate form, just as Peter Fitzpatrick points out, 82 or a heaven of concepts as H.L.A. Hart fears. 83 Once again, the international community, as the consequence of a rational construction, is reified from experienced events (except for the generat ing experience of desiring rational justifications). Franck goes further and explains that acts of intellectualization displace social practices in favour of 'a pyramid of secondary rules at whose apex is an ultimate rule or set of rules of recognition. The ultimate rule defines the community.' 84 The community is 'a club'. Its members enjoy a special status. 85 The international community is 'structured' and centrally organized in contrast to 'unstructured, standardless interactions between actors', according to Franck. 86 Acts of intellectualization are 'our critic not our mirror', Dworkin adds. 87 All this transpires in the name of the international community which is believed to represent the whole. And yet, the consequence, as with the implied consent approach, is that the peremptory norms risk being reified vis-à-vis the ethos of the international community.
854
The neverending trace of justifications of the concepts constituting the interna tional community impacts upon the problematics of peremptory norms in a second manner. The membership of the international community will depend upon whether the state members and their officials take for granted that justificatory arguments count for what are peremptory norms. The consequence is that, as so many 19thcentury jurists concluded, societies which lacked a statecentric institutional structure would fail to pass muster as members of the international community. This exclusionary fea ture of an international community has continued into contemporary international law thought. Franck excludes 'undeveloped' societies from membership of the interna tional community, for example, because such societies depreciate rational argument. 88 Dworkin insists in his early work that a community must share a genre and narrative with a shared plot, a point, characters, and the like. Only participants who share the desire rationally to justify concepts in terms of a rationally coherent narrative would count as members of the ethos. 89 More recently, Dworkin himself excludes some of his contemporaries from membership in what he conceives as the genre and narrative about analytical jurisprudence. 90 Membership of a community requires a reciprocity, Dworkin argues. 91 This reciprocity, though, is a reciprocity of justifications rather than of the recognition of each and all as experiential beings in an ethos. 92 The interrelation of abstractions goes handinhand with what Georg Schwarzenberger describes as a 'center of government with overwhelming physical force and courts with compulsory jurisdiction to formulate rules akin to those of public policy on the national level'.
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Only in Dworkin's effort, an 'abstract and ethereal sovereign' -the interrelation of arguments and principles -is the 'sword, shield and menace' of the legal order.
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The very preoccupation of AngloAmerican legal reasoning with doctrines and rules, both being the products of acts of intellectualization, once again risks rein forcing the territorial boundary of the members of the international community. Preoccupied with the decomposition (what we call analysis) of concepts, we typify or categorize the experienced world to such a point that social experiences are lifted into an intellectual world reified from the social practices. 95 Dworkin for his part holds that 88 Ibid., at 197-198. 89 To be fair, Dworkin naively (I believe) claims that all citizens will be such participants. He certainly would shudder at Postema's suggestion that the participants are 'selfidentified': see Postema, 'Normativity of Law', supra note 71. That said, there is a universality (or imperial character) about the rational commu nity so that those who do not participate (that is, those who lack a 'sense of integrity') are excluded from the rational community. 90 He urges that Critical Legal Studies 'should be rescued' but only if we assume that 'its aims are those of law as integrity, that it works to discover whether, and how far, judges have avenues open for improving law while respecting the virtues of fraternity integrity serves. These are indeed the aims of at least some members of the movement': Dworkin, supra note 78, at 275. 91 Ibid., at 199. 92 This sense of ethicality is elaborated in Conklin, supra note 18, at 167-187. 93 94 Dworkin, supra note 78, at p. vii. 95 Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', supra note 72, at 751-752, 756-759. the international community is 'sophisticated' if participants are skilled in the analyti cal methodology of justifying the rules. A hierarchy of societies with rationally skilled members at the pinnacle is thereby built into our legal consciousness. Once again, the jurist cannot climb outside this international community in order to observe customs or to test 'who is a member of the international community'. The participants possess a rational or cognitive sense of belonging with a rationally constructed community. 96 The consequence is that the rational community defines itself and, at the same time, claims a universality for itself. Violence risks being the consequence as we impose our categories -perhaps we even call them peremptory norms -over iterative social expe riences in the name of a reified 'international community'.
The question is, then, what renders an international community a community? The international community, to be a community, would have to exist independently of the territorial boundaries of its members. Even Dworkin has more recently posited that a different sense of a community from the rational justification one is needed. 97 The International Court has affirmed that the international community is composed of individuals and even social groups, not just territorial states. 98 So too, the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR has presupposed in many of its General Comments that the international community is composed of individual human beings as well as of states. And the International Court suggests in the Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 that 'a true universality principle' must lack 'territorial or nationality linkage'. 99 Can we identify duties to the 'international community' with out understanding a sense and the possibility of an international community which exists as if the territorial boundaries of state members are transparent?
C The Peremptory Norm and the Ethos of the International Community
The challenge presented to us is to understand the relation of peremptory norms in a manner in which the international community is independent of the aggregate of the wills of states and yet nested in the ethoi of the international community. The implied consent sense of an international community begins with what it takes as the socialcultural world and constructs an international community reified from the ethos with which it allegedly began. The rational basis community begins with a belief presupposed of expert knowers of the ethos only to lop off such an ethos in hopes that the rationally constructed international community will itself become an ethos. Reification problematizes both approaches. If the international community as a whole were constituted from the shared selfinterests of each state, then why would a state support a peremptory norm if the norms undermined the identity of a state as a sovereign entity? If there is some ultimate referent which is analytically prior to and hierarchically above the selfinterests of a state, is such a referent a mere empty category which ultimately camouflages the aggregate of particular wills of separate but equal sovereign states? Is it possible that there is a sense of an international com munity independent of its members and yet nested in its ethos?
The very nature of a peremptory norm, we have seen, is that the norm overrides and, indeed, renders void the wills of states. This leads us to a third sense of the inter national community. Here, the community is objective in that it exists independently of the consent of states. This is so, though, at the very moment that the community exists for the consent of its members as features of the ethos.
The international legal order exists whether or not a particular state consents to its peremptory norms. The very reliance upon the sources thesis depends upon an inter national community which recognizes, protects, and guides states with territorial bor ders. Without peremptory norms which protect a statecentric legal order, some other international legal order would exist. 100 The question of the existence of peremptory norms returns us to the iterative experienced events of the socialcultural ethos of the international community. The content of peremptory norms is directed towards and protects just such social assumptions and expectations. The assumptions and expec tations embody the international community. The contentindependent analysis of sources and of justificatory arguments, however, has forgotten the importance of the ethos of the international community. Peremptory norms are integral phenomeno logical conditions for the very existence of the international legal order.
This relation of a peremptory norm and the international legal order returns us to the Speech of the Laws. If a member of the polis were allowed to violate a law, the Laws maintain, the very existence of the whole legal order would be challenged (Crito 50b). If members of an alleged community are allowed to torture human beings, to enslave inhabitants, turn a blind eye to mass rape and genocide, and expel stateless persons as members of ethnic groups, then can one still maintain that such an entity is a community? Does it presuppose a legal order? The international (and domestic) legal order is analytically prior and anthropologically prior in time to the state's acts. Arthur Watts suggests this analytically prior international legal order when he asserts that international crimes 'offend against the public order of the international commu nity'. 101 And Alexander Orakhelashvili states that '[t]he very essence of public order in every legal system consists in ensuring that public interest is preserved in the face of private transactions motivated by individual interests of legal persons'. Indeed, contravention of peremptory norms would appear to undermine the very existence of a state, even if the state does not consent to the norm and even if the state causing harm to the international community no longer exists as a legal entity. If a state causes grave harm to a peremptory norm, the very possibility of the interna tional legal order is undermined. But with such a dissolution of the international legal order, the state's domestic legal order as a legal order is also undermined. To be sure, state consent and justificatory argument are elements of the ethos of the contempo rary international legal order. So too, though, are proscriptions against genocide, tor ture, slavery, systematic rape, and mass displacements of a populace. My point is that the recognition of a state as a member of the international community is not because the state is selfreliant as the hard sovereignty model presupposes, nor the conse quence of the recognition by other states as soft sovereignty presupposes. Rather than being ends in themselves, states exist by virtue of an international legal order. The sense of obligation of state officials and the state practices relate to the very possibility of a (international) legal order. This point can extend to international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individual human beings. In sum, a peremp tory norm exists independently of state members of the international community, and yet for those very members because, without the peremptory norm, there would not be a (domestic or international) legal order of which the states are legal entities.
Returning to the issues with which I introduced this article, a peremptory norm may emerge or even be displaced by another peremptory norm, as suggested in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention, because the ethos of the international community may change through time. So too, an individual right may initially exist outside the struc ture of peremptory norms and yet, through time, emerge as a peremptory norm.
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A social entity may be harmed by a violation of a peremptory norm even though the entity is not a member of the international community. Although a state which has caused harm to peremptory norms no longer exists, all members of the international community owe a duty to protect and enforce the peremptory norm. If peremptory norms are violated when they would otherwise protect stateless persons, all members of the community owe a legal obligation to fulfil or enforce the peremptory norms. A civil or criminal remedy may be forthcoming to a nonstate even though a state did not suffer compensatory losses. An individual may be harmed by virtue of harm to the ethos of the international legal order as a whole. Such an individual is a beneficiary of the legal order. Human rights are important because of their relation and the extent of their relation to peremptory norms, although beneficiaries may exist outside the international legal structure. Peremptory norms exist as often unwritten pillars of the ethos of an international legal order -unwritten until the very existence of the legal order is at issue.
The analytically and anthropologically prior international community is not some thing new to international legal discourse. The rite of passage through an interna tional strait, for example, has been considered to be analogous to a peremptory norm 858 EJIL 23 (2012), in that the right protects the international community independently of any treaty. 104 In the 1951 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, for example, the International Court explained that the parties to a human rights treaty 'do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accom plishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the Convention'. 105 In the South-West African Cases, Jessup held, dissenting, that '[s]tates may have a general interest -cognizable in the International Court -in the maintenance of an international regime adopted for the common benefit of the international society'. 106 The Barcelona case, discussed earlier, explained in 1961 that the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole are 'the concern of all states' in contrast with duties owed by one state to another state by virtue of their legal rela tionship inter se. This 'concern of all states' leads to 'outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination'. 107 After Barcelona, the International Court has consistently held that peremptory norms exist by virtue of their relation to the international community as an end in itself. 108 State Responsibility also take for granted that peremptory norms exist by virtue of their support for the international community. 112 Peremptory norms reinforce and guard the ethos of the international commu nity. All inhabitants, as a consequence, have a legal interest in ensuring compli ance with the peremptory norm. And individual human beings and nonstate actors become members just as are states today. The international community exists other than through the selfinterest of shared economic, military, or political matters. 113 Hersch Lauterpacht missed this point. 114 The question I pose is whether the inter national community is the product of territorially bounded entities or is it an entity which possesses legitimacy independently of the wills of states? If international law is constituted from a community defined by a territorial boundary, then it too will act from an arbitrary will vis-à-vis social entities exterior to the territorial boundary of state members. How can human rights, alleged to be peremptory norms, be uni versally shared amongst the inhabitants of such states if the states' arbitrary wills win the day?
The point that bears emphasis is that all inhabitants and states members have an interest in enforcing peremptory norms because of harm caused to the international legal order, a legal order objective to the members and yet nested in the ethos of the community. The International Law Commission hints at such a sense of harm. 115 There is something about a peremptory norm which protects the community independently of its members and yet exists for the protection of its members.
Who, then, are the members of the international community if the community exists independently of the members and yet for the members? The universal char acter of the international community as a whole, according to the International Law Commission, includes nonstate entities such as the United Nations, the International Red Cross, and the European Community. 116 It also includes transnational corpora tions, NGOs, insurgents, minorities, diplomatically and de jure stateless individuals and groups, 'peoples', and nationals who lack a minimal legal or economic security of protection. Much as the Laws asserted about Socrates' dependence upon the legal order, so too the ILC has claimed that individual human beings 'should be regarded as the ultimate beneficiaries' of the international legal order. 117 The remedying state
